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Abstract 
The article compares, on the issues of religious symbols in public space, the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, and that of the US Supreme Court. The enquiry aims at outlining a 
comparison between the contents of the decisions, not between the Courts: one is a constitutional 
court, the other an international court which in the late decades has been a breakthrough in the 
European system of guarantees. The main points emerged through the comparison are: first of all, the 
European Court, unlike the US SC, is clearly engaged in building a European secularism that leaves 
religious symbols outside the public space. The Strasbourg Court adopts a conception of secularism 
which, in principle, is very different from American secularism. Secondly, although in different ways, 
both Courts employ arguments based on tradition and history, to the detriment of individual and 
minority interests. Thirdly, there is a certain deference towards the choices made by national 
authorities: for the critics of the Roberts Court, this attitude deserves to be stigmatized in a 
constitutional jurisdiction. 
Keywords 
Secularism; religious symbols in public space; ECtHR; US Supreme Court; national Constitutions.
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1. Introductory remarks  
I have been asked to try a comparison, on the issues of religious symbols in public space, between the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR), and that of the US Supreme 
Court
1
. 
With regard to the latter, I have taken into account the following rulings: Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum; Salazar v. Buono; Town of Greece v. Galloway. In different ways, these decisions – 
concerning the display of religious symbols (Pleasant Grove v. Summum and Salazar v. Buono) or the 
practice of prayer (Town of Greece v. Galloway) in public space – are an opportunity to widen the 
scope of the Italian and European debate on secularism (laicità
2
 in Italian) and religious symbols in 
public space: one might conclude that on both shores of the Atlantic these are divisive and slippery 
issues
3
. The US case law analyzed in this essay leads me to confront it with some cases decided by the 
ECtHR, and above all with Lautsi v. Italy, concerning the display of the Crucifix in public schools. 
The issue of religious freedom – which for a long time in Europe appeared to be settled, at least 
with regard to the separation between State and Church
4
 – came back to the public attention in these 
years in Europe, with a focus on the limits which ought to be imposed, respectively, to freedom of 
religion and from religion and, ultimately, on the negotiation techniques between individual and 
collective rights. From this viewpoint, undoubtedly the ECtHR has been less sensitive towards certain 
individual aspects of religious freedom that constitute the core of article 9 of the ECHR, namely the 
individual’s right to decide on matters of religion and morals, and therefore to conduct a life according 
to the dictates of his own conscience
5
. 
I wish to stress that my enquiry aims at outlining a comparison between the contents of the 
decisions, not between the Courts: one is a constitutional court, the other an international court which 
in the late decades has been a breakthrough in the European system of guarantees
6
. 
In particular, for a better understanding of the role of the ECtHR case law on the issues at stake, it 
is worth recalling some significant traits which characterized the Court over the last few years.  
Above all, it cannot be stressed enough that the ECtHR rules on the specific case brought before it, 
and that, in doing so, the Court – differently from the national judge7 – does not have to balance a 
                                                     
1
 Comparison already taken on by Z. R. Calo, Constructing the Secular: Law and Religion Jurisprudence in Europe and 
the United States, EUI working paper, RSCAS 2014/94, 2014, available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32792/RSCAS_2014_94.pdf?sequence=1; M. L. Movsesian, Crosses and 
Culture: State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US and Europe, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, (2012), 1-25. 
2
 In Europe, a word is used, which has no proper English translation: “laicity”, “laïcité”, “laicità”. The meanings of this 
notion vary largely in different national systems. While the American model prohibits the endorsement of any single 
faith, in Europe the tag of “laicity” also applies to systems which tribute a special treatment to the prevalent confession. 
3
 J. H.H. Weiler, State and Nation; Church, Mosque and Synagogue_the trailer, (2010), ICON Vol. 8 No. 2, 157. 
4
 See for an historical perspective M. Ventura, The changing civil religion of secular Europe, The George Washington 
International Law Review, (2010) 41 4, 947 ff. 
5
 J. Martinez-Torron, The (Un)protection of Individual Religious Identity in the Strasbourg Case Law, Oxford Journal of 
Law and Religion, (2012), p. 3. 
6
 M. Ventura underlined that « […] the development of a European jurisdiction is highly valuable thanks to four basic 
virtues and, in particular, to its role: 1) as a counter balance to denominational majorities and to religious nationalism; 2) 
as a unique laboratory of concepts and tools; 3) as a contribution to national debate and evolution; 4) and as an instrument 
for forging a supranational open space of religious diversity, freedom of thought and social cohesion», Law and Religion 
Issues in Strasbourg and Luxembourg: The Virtues of European Courts, (November 2011), available at 
http://www.eui.eu/Projects/ReligioWest/Documents/events/conferencePapers/Ventura.pdf.  
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single right or liberty against the others enshrined in the Convention, which is construed as a living 
instrument. This means that European judges occasionally affirm rights which are note expressly 
provided for in the text of the Convention. This interpretative activity reaches its maximum extent of 
creativity with regard to rights – more precisely, claims for rights, drove forward by sections of the 
European population – whose recognition is not legally and politically unanimous at the national level. 
Through such case law, the European judges establish an ideal definition of the minimum standard for 
a democratic society, which should apply, in its broader and fundamental aspects, in all the 47 
countries which are members of the Council of Europe. In abstract terms, this ideal definition may not 
be problematic, but it becomes so if one looks at the new contents inoculated in the rights and 
principles of equality, non-discrimination, secularism and pluralism, as established in the national 
Constitutions. 
In this perspective, some put great emphasis on the ECtHR, and go so far as to hold that it is 
evolving into a peculiar European constitutional court
8
. Several elements underpin this conclusion: the 
perception by the ECtHR of its own role, as exemplified in its rulings
9
; its intense interpretative 
activism, which has been recalled above; the pilot judgment procedure, which – as noted lately – 
broadens the scope of the Court, from the single case, to a general evaluation of a piece of national 
legislation, deemed to be lacking or malfunctioning
10
. 
Italian judges made several remarks towards this activism. Most recently, and most fiercely, 
judgment n. 49 of 2015 of the Constitutional court held that Italian courts are bound by a Strasbourg 
decision only if it: a) decides precisely on the same case which is brought again before the Italian 
judge; b) is part of a well-established and consistent thread of European case law; c) is a pilot 
judgment
11
. As it is well known, similar attitudes, in defense of the national legal systems, have been 
adopted also by other European constitutional courts, albeit with variations
12
. 
2. ECtHR case law on religious symbols 
In the Convention, the basic texts are article 9, on freedom of religion in general; article 14, which 
includes religion among the personal conditions, which may not be a cause for discrimination; article 2 
(Contd.)                                                                  
7
 In the decision no. 317/2009 the Italian Constitutional Court stated that «Naturally, it is for the European Court to decide 
on the individual case and the individual fundamental right, whilst the national authorities have a duty to prevent the 
protection of certain fundamental rights – including from the general and unitary perspective of Article 2 of the 
Constitution – from developing in an unbalanced manner to the detriment of other rights also protected by the 
Constitution and by the European Convention». On the dialogue between the ECtHR and the Italian Constitutional Court 
see D. Tega, I diritti in crisi, Milano, (2012). 
8
 B. M. ZUPANCIC, former judge of the ECtHR, The Owl of Minerva, Essays on Human Rights, Utrecht (2008), 352 nt. 5; 
S. GREER, European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects, New York (2006), 173, 
stated that «The Court is already ‘‘the Constitutional Court for Europe’’ in the sense that it is the final authoritative 
judicial tribunal in the only pan-European constitutional system there is»; J.-F. FLAUSS, La Cour européenne des droits 
de l’homme est-elle une Cour constitutionnelle?, Revue française de Droit constitutionnel (1998), 711 ss. 
9
 G. Raimondi, the Vice-President of the ECtHR, said that the Court rules on single cases, but also feel as if playing a 
constitutional role, see Corte di Strasburgo e Stati: dialoghi non sempre facili. Intervista a cura di Diletta Tega a Guido 
Raimondi, Quaderni costituzionali, (2014), 468; in the same perspective, see the memoir of a well-known former 
President of the Court, J.P. Costa, La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Des juges pour la liberté, Paris, (2013). 
10
 M. FYRNYS, Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot Judgment Procedure of the European Court of 
Human Rights, German Law Journal (2011), 1231 ss. 
11
 See on that decision Diletta Tega, A National Narrative: The Constitution’s Axiological Prevalence on the ECHR–A 
Comment on the Italian Constitutional Court Judgment No. 49/2015, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, May 1, 2015, 
at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/04/mini-symposium-on-cc-judgment-49-2015. 
12
 See e.g. the Bundesverfassungsgericht’ s decision Gorgülü-Beschluß (BVerfG 2 BvR 1481/04, 14th October 2004); UK 
Supreme court’s decision Horncastle (UKSC 14, 9th December 2009). 
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of Protocol n. 1, on education
13
. Article 9 recognizes freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
with the latter including the right to change one’s creed, to manifest it individually and collectively, 
both in private and in public, through cult, teaching, practice and observance. The “positive” content is 
very similar to the definition established in other international documents, which reiterates the classic 
distinction between internal and public fora and especially emphasizes the right to change one’s 
religious convictions. Only the manifestation of one’s faith may be limited, if it is necessary in a 
democratic society, on grounds of public security, protection of order, health or public morality, or for 
the protection of others’ rights and liberties. As highlighted by the ECtHR, limitations are meant to 
allow the coexistence of several faiths, conciliate the interests of different creeds and ensure respect 
for the convictions of everyone
14
. In its turn, Protocol n. 1, opened to ratification in 1952 and entered 
into force in 1954, states, in its article 2, that the rights to education may not be denied to anyone, and 
that the State, while exercising its functions in the field of education and teaching, must respect the 
parents’ right to provide such an education and teaching according to their own religious and 
philosophical beliefs. Initially, it had been proposed to include this provision directly in the 
Convention; but it was rather placed in the Protocol, due to serious disagreements on the role of the 
State with regard to the public and private education system. 
More specifically, the case law on religious symbols mainly concerns the display of the crucifix in 
public schools (Lautsi v. Italy) and the Islamic headscarf worn by teachers (Dahlab v. Switzerland, 
2001), students in universities (Karaduman v. Turkey, 1993; Şahin v. Turkey, 2005) 15 or high schools 
(Dogru and Kervanci v. France, 2008), or ordinary citizens (S.A.S. v. France, 2014) or public servants 
(Ebrahimian v. France, 2015)
16
. In 2013 Eweida and others v. The United Kingdom dealt with an 
employee forbidden to wear a small necklace with a cross.  
In all these rulings, except Eweida, the ECtHR has never found a breach of freedom of religion, as 
enshrined in article 9: on the one hand, it recognized a wide margin of appreciation to the States with 
regard to their relationships with religious confessions; on the other hand, it has underlined that, when 
the majority belongs to a certain confession, not all the manifestations of that belief are acceptable, as 
they may constitute a form of pressure on non-believers. These cases are well-known and I will not 
dwell on their description; they all concern legal systems which entail an at least partly similar 
meaning of secularism (laicità in Italian, or laïcité in French), although the Turkish State exerts a 
definitely special control over religion
17. The decision on the case of Leyla Şahin, a Turkish university 
student, offers a remarkable example both of that control and of a objectionable ruling: the Court 
affirms the sacrifice imposed on the student, forbidding her from wearing the Islamic headscarf, due to 
                                                     
13
 In the extensive literature see D. Harris, M. O’ Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2 
ed., Oxford University Press, (2009), 697 ss.; F. Tulkens, The European Convention on Human Rights and Church-State 
Relations: Pluralism vs. Pluralism, in 30 Cardozo Law Review, (2008/2009), 2575 ss.; I. T. Plesner, Legal Limitations To 
Freedom of Religion or Belief in School Education, in Emory International Law Review, (2005), 557 ss.; C. Evans, 
Freedom of religion under the European Convention on human rights, Oxford, (2001). 
14
 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25th May 1993, pgr 33. 
15
 I choose consciously to not mention the Refah Partisi decisions, I believe that, despite a reflection on the notion of 
secularism is implied, they involve many different topics. 
16
 See the critical comment by E. Brems, Ebrahimian v France: headscarf ban upheld for entire public sector, November 
27, 2015, at: http://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/11/27/ebrahimian-v-france-headscarf-ban-upheld-for-entire-public-
sector/. 
17 It is significant that, in recent years, the European Court has declined to support strict secularist policies at least outside 
educational environment. In the case Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey, 23rd February 2010, the Court found a violation of article 9 
of the Convention: Turkey is thus condemned for having arrested and place in police custody the applicants because, on 
their way to a religious ceremony, they toured the streets of Ankara while wearing the distinctive dress of their group, 
which evoked that of the leading prophets and was made up of a turban, “salvar” (baggy “harem” trousers), a tunic and a 
stick. It is has to be pointed out that the Court emphasized that the case concerned punishment for wearing of particular 
dress in public areas that were open to all, and not, as in other cases, regulation of the wearing of religious symbols in 
public establishments, where religious neutrality might take precedence over the right to manifest one’s religion. 
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the legal, historical, sociological and contingent context of the Turkish legal system, and it finds no 
way to take into balance the individual freedom to manifest one’s beliefs18. 
It is well-known that Turkey derived its approach to the public expression of religion from the 
French tradition. A very recent declination of laïcité can be found in S.A.S. v. France: in that case, the 
Grand Chamber accepted the Government’ argument that «the face plays an important role in social 
interaction, understanding the view that individuals who are present in places open to all may not wish 
to see practices or attitudes developing there which would fundamentally call into question the 
possibility of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an established consensus, forms an 
indispensable element of community life within the society in question. The Court is therefore able to 
accept that the barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent 
State as breaching the right of others to live in a space of socialization which makes living together 
easier». 
In particular I believe that the Dahlab v. Switzerland decision (more recently also Ebrahimian v. 
France regarding public servants not belonging to the public educational field) is interesting for the 
point I want to make: this time, the forbidden Islamic headscarf was worn by a teacher, a public officer 
employed by the Canton of Geneva. The ECtHR, finding no violation of the freedom of the applicant, 
considers the sacrifice justified by the public quality of the employee, as that Canton has opted for a 
strict separation between Church and State, for an education system characterized by sex equality and 
neutrality, and for a special respect towards the young pupils, deemed particularly impressionable, and 
their beliefs. Because of this, the Court concludes, the Islamic headscarf is hardly compatible with a 
message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination, which the 
teachers in a democratic society must teach to their students.  
On that same topic the Federal Constitutional Court (in a 6-2 decision), more correctly in my 
opinion, on the 17th of March 2015, invalidated the North Rhine-Westphalia law provisions
19
: the 
statute governing public schools prohibited political, religious, or other ideological expressions by 
public school teachers if these expressions had the potential to endanger or disturb state neutrality or 
the peace at school. In particular, these outward expressions were impermissible if they could suggest 
to students and parents that the teacher objects to human dignity, equality, fundamental rights or the 
democratic order. Finally, the provision also declared the expression of Christian and Western 
teachings, cultural values, and traditions to be permissible. The state-wide prohibition of religious 
expression by outward appearance—wearing a headscarf—was considered disproportionate. The 
Federal Constitutional Court stated that only a concrete danger to state neutrality or the peace at school 
would justify prohibiting the exercise of a binding religious command. On the question of privileging 
Christian symbols and traditions, the Court concluded that such favoring treatment is unconstitutional. 
                                                     
18
 I fully agree with the dissenting opinion of the judge F. Tulkens, in particular when she affirms that «Par ailleurs, 
pluralisme, tolérance et esprit d’ouverture sont les caractéristiques essentielles d’une société démocratique et certains 
effets en découlent. D’une part, ces idéaux et ces valeurs d’une société démocratique doivent se fonder sur le dialogue et 
un esprit de compromis, ce qui implique nécessairement de la part des personnes des concessions réciproques. D’autre 
part, le rôle des autorités n’est pas d’enrayer la cause des tensions en éliminant le pluralisme mais de veiller, comme la 
Cour vient encore de le rappeler, à ce que les groupes opposés ou concurrents se tolèrent les uns les autres (Ouranio Toxo 
et autres c. Grèce, no 74989/01, § 40, CEDH 2005-X)».  
19
 The North Rhine-Westphalia enacted a provision in its statute governing public schools that prohibited political, 
religious, or other ideological expressions by public school teachers if these expressions have the potential to endanger or 
disturb state neutrality or the peace at school. In particular, these outward expressions are impermissible if they could 
suggest to students and parents that the teacher objects to human dignity, equality, fundamental rights or the democratic 
order. Finally, the provision also declared the expression of Christian and Western teachings, cultural values, and 
traditions to be permissible. 
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If the display of religious messages by teachers is to be prohibited, such a prohibition must apply 
equally to all religions
20
. 
In the perspective of such attitude towards religious symbols is it therefore possible to state that the 
ECtHR is building a notion of secularism of the State and freedom of religion, where a special 
importance belongs to the exclusion of religious symbols from the public space, as well as to the 
exemption from religious teaching
21
?  
With regard to religious symbols, it took a while for the Court to deal with a legal system different 
from the French or the Turkish, which, as noted above, share a similar concept of secularism. The 
occasion came in 2009, when the European judge had to rule on the case of the crucifix in public 
Italian schoolrooms. In the first judgment of the 3rd November 2009, the ECtHR recalled its 
precedents on the Islamic headscarf, without considering the margin of appreciation, which is not even 
mentioned in the whole decision, and attached to the crucifix the very same “strong significance” 
attached to the teacher’s headscarf in the Swiss case. In Lautsi (1), the Court appeared to have 
elaborate its own a notion of secularism and seemed prepared to apply it without regard to the margin 
of appreciation. If the case had been decided following then same patterns applied in previous rulings 
on religious symbols, then it would have been possible to give room to a broad reading of the margin 
of appreciation, and to appreciate all the normative and legal traits relevant to secularism and the 
display of the crucifix. Ultimately, the ECtHR chose to apply the patterns of the case law on parental 
freedom of education (consider Grand Chamber, Folgerø et al. v. Norway, 29th June 2007), 
emphasizing the indoctrination message of the crucifix and its capacity to emotively upset student 
belonging to other confessions, or to none
22
. 
In Lautsi (2) of 18th March 2011, the Grand Chamber, with a judgment more articulate than Lautsi 
(1), reversed, at least in part, the previous ruling. In brief, the ECtHR enforced the national margin of 
appreciation, although specifying that cultural and historical tradition - particularly emphasized both 
by the Italian administrative judge and Government - does not exempt from the obligation to respect 
the rights and freedoms proclaimed in the Convention. According to the Grand Chamber, the decision 
whether to display the crucifix pertains to the national margin of appreciation, more so because there 
is no European consensus on this issue, and unless the ECtHR finds that the prohibition of 
indoctrination has been violated. So the crucifix is saved in extremis as a «passive symbol», incapable 
of influencing the students as other religious activities (it is also true, as some commentators have 
noted, that the Court found that no decision is necessary on article 9, i.e. with regard to religious 
freedom properly).  
It is worth recalling that two dissenting opinions advocated the enactment of some sort of coercion 
test: the same test, as we will see below, used by the US Supreme Court to assess the violation of 
religious freedom through the display of religious symbols. 
With regard to the question I posed above, I think an answer might be as follows: it is true that the 
ECtHR gives a special importance to the exclusion of religious symbols from the public space, but the 
Grand Chamber in Lautsi (2) showed that the main features of the national legal system have to be 
                                                     
20
 See Claudia Haupt, The “New” German Teacher Headscarf Decision, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Mar. 17, 2015, 
at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/03/the-new-german-teacher-headscarf-decision. 
21
 On common European trends relating to religious freedom see A. Ferrari, Religious, Secularity and Democracy in 
Europe: For a New Kelsenian Pact, in Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/2005, 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/05/050301.pdf 
22
 See on that decision S. Mancini, The Crucifix Rage. Supranational Constitutionalism Bumps Against the Counter-
Majoritarian Difficulty, (June 12, 2010). EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW, vol. 6, (2010). Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1624325. 
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pondered carefully. In other words, the ECtHR ideological paradigm
23
, based on an antireligious 
secularist approach, is not shared by the constitutional foundations of all 47 countries of the Council of 
Europe. The Grand Chamber had to remind to the entire Court that it is not a constitutional court.  
I believe that a special influence in the ECtHR is played either by the cultural and professional 
background of the judges and by their agenda: on the one hand, for those who knows the case law of 
the Strasbourg Court, it is pretty clear that some judges push forward with a clear vision of what 
should be the common content of traditional legal concepts. In such a context, it appears also quite 
clear that there are legal systems that are considered leading model, such as the French. It is, on the 
other hand, also true that Lautsi (2) showed a strong, broad range of activity, carried out by an equally 
broad spectrum of mainly conservative actors
24
. In that case we experienced an example of common 
ground between US and Europe: a conservative US-based law firm represented eight out of ten of the 
intervening governments supporting the Italian position
25
.  
This bluntly reveals a deeper truth which should be confronted and not put it aside, if the main goal 
is pursuing a real flourishing of the ECtHR strength: in the ECHR system, the two sides of the medal, 
the national and the international, have still to reach the perfect blending. This particular case law 
clearly shows the clash between two competing and opposite identities: the international, that reflects 
only the leading national traditions, and the consolidated national identity
26
. 
This ambivalent nature may help explaining what I stated in the introduction: this case law is a 
clear example that the ECtHR has been poorly sensitive towards the individuals’ right to conduct a life 
according to the dictates of their own conscience. 
3. US Supreme Court cases 
Now I turn to the well-known judgments on religion clauses: the Free Exercise Clause («Congress 
shall make no law […] Prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]») and the Establishment Clause 
(«Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion»). These are complementary 
provisions, aiming at protecting religious freedom from government interferences. In particular, the 
Establishment Clause protects freedom of conscience, ensuring that the government is not aligned with 
a specific religion, or with religion generally, and that, at the same time, it does not prevent the free 
exercise of religion. In this perspective, the Establishment Clause is instrumental to inclusion, 
allowing all the citizens to perceive themselves as part of the Nation itself. 
                                                     
23
 Contra M. Ventura, «Some critics see the European courts’ case law on religion as the imposition of an ideology foreign 
to European history and culture and enemy to national identities and traditions. On the contrary, I believe that the 
European jurisdiction in Strasbourg and Luxembourg is consistent with a European project, unfolding through the 
dialogue, at times the dialectic, between the secular and the religious, the national and the supranational, the courts and 
the Parliaments. By no means are the virtues highlighted above meant to herald a supposed superiority of European 
courts. They rather reside in a unique experiment of diversity, equality and freedom.», Law and Religion Issues in 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg, cit. 
24
 A ‘grasstops mobilization’ has been defined by E. Fokas, Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilizations in 
the Shadow of European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, 
(2015), in particular pp. 64-65.  
25
 Among the third-party interveners, supporting a decision against Lautsi (1), there were also thirty-three members of the 
European Parliament and four of ten NGO’s. See the critical essay of P. Annichino, Winning the battle by losing the War: 
The Lautsi Case and the Holy Alliance between American Conservative Evangelical, the Russian Orthodox Church and 
the Vatican to Reshape European Identity, (2011) 6 (3) Religion and Human Rights: An International Journal, 213. 
26
 On the contrary M. Ventura stated that «While I do not deny the many deficiencies of the Court of Strasbourg, I believe 
that those who blame the Court for its role in the ideological and political debate on secularism, civil religion, 
multiculturalism and religious nationalism, neglect that such a role is nothing but the mirror of tensions and divisions 
within Europe and within each European country», Law and Religion Issues in Strasbourg and Luxembourg, cit.  
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Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (555 U.S. 2009) poses a very clear question: does the Free Speech 
Clause in the First Amendment entail the right for private groups to be authorized to permanently 
display a monument with a religious significance in a town park? The answer of the Supreme Court, 
differently from the question, is very ambiguous. 
Ruling for the first time on such a case, in an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court 
unanimously held that the First Amendment is not relevant: while a park is a public forum, subject to 
the respect of the Free Speech Clause, the permanent display of a monument in the same public park is 
rather government speech, traditionally not subject to the Free Speech Clause. 
Government speech allows the administration to choose what it feels appropriate, considering 
aesthetics, history and local culture, without necessarily accepting as its own the specific meaning 
attached by the donors to the monument. Therefore, according to the Court, it is correct that in the 
public park of Pleasant Grove the so called seven aphorisms of Summum are not exposed, but instead 
the Ten Commandments are, through a monument donated back in 1971 by the Fraternal Order of 
Eagles in an effort to curb juvenile delinquency. 
In reading the judgment, a ‘European eye’ is particularly attracted by two speculations of the Court: 
firstly, on the limits of government speech and its relations with private speech in public places
27
; 
secondly, on the weight of the Establishment Clause, although it is not directly called into question in 
this case, differently from the other two. 
On the first point, the concurring opinion of Justice Souter gives some kind of answer: in order to 
avoid that the administration favors certain private religious groups over others in choosing which 
monuments to display, it is necessary to assess, on a case by case basis, if the monuments belong to 
government speech or, on the contrary, express a religious meaning which the government may not 
assert. 
In this perspective, the Court engages itself in a difficult semiology exercise, which is very 
interesting. It makes clear that: a) a message changes over time; b) is subjective; c) may be altered by 
the near presence of other monuments. This should explain why the administration does not 
necessarily adopts the same specific meaning which the donor “sees” in the donated monument. 
On the second point, undoubtedly the Establishment Clause casts a problematic shadow on the 
decision: not by chance, Scalia excludes passing from the «Free Speech Clause frying pan into the 
Establishment Clause fire» (obviously, the more the town defends the Ten Commandments 
monument, the more it looks as if promoting a religion over another, risking a breach of the 
Establishment Clause) by referring to a famous precedent of 2005, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 
when the C.J. Rehnquist plurality stated that the Ten Commandments monument (basically identical to 
the one in the Pleasant Grove park) had an unmistakable historical meaning, besides a religious one, 
and that “simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine 
does not run afoul of the establishment clause”.  
Conclusively, the legitimization – through the government speech doctrine and semiology – of a 
religiously characterized representation reminds some debate that took place also in Europe. This 
doctrine “neutralizes” the presence of the religious monument, first, arguing on the diversity of 
messages it can deliver and, secondly, accepting that the administration does not necessarily endorses 
the specific meaning which is more relevant to the donor. The Italian lawyer cannot escape recalling 
the highly disputable judgment given in decision n. 556 of 13
th
 February 2006 by the Council of State 
(the appellate administrative court) on the famous Lautsi case: by diminishing the religious relevance 
of the crucifix, in favor of the historical one, the Council of State allowed it to remain displayed in the 
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 F. M. Gedicks, R. Hendrix, Uncivil religion: Judeo-Christianity and the Ten Commandments, in West Virginia Law 
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public school attended by the applicant’s children, but belittled the prevalently religious message of 
the symbol
28
. 
In Salazar v. Buono (559 U.S. 2010), the Court again turns to the religious meaning attributable to 
a monument: this time, a wooden cross installed in 1934 by a private citizen in a remote area of the 
Mojave National Park, a federal terrain, to commemorate the American soldiers fallen during the First 
World War. The cross was a meeting point for Easter ceremonies. The applicant, Buono, obtained an 
injunction for the government to remove the cross, deemed to be in breach of the Establishment 
Clause. The injunction was confirmed also after the Department of Defense Appropriations Act (the 
so-called land transfer statute), with which, in 2004, the Secretary of Interior had transferred, in 
exchange for another parcel of land, the ground on which the cross for the «Veterans of Foreign Wars» 
had been erected, with the understanding that the plot would remain a memorial to fallen soldiers. 
While the violation of the Establishment Clause is clearly the issue at stake before the lower courts, 
technically the question posed this time to the Supreme Court is if the transfer of the land, where the 
cross is placed, is legitimate. And this time the Court – with a 5-4 vote, whose opinion has been 
delivered by Justice Kennedy – sends the issue back to the District Court for further consideration. 
The plurality opinion is that the significance always recognized to the cross is memorial, not 
religious. The cross, which has been standing there for 70 years (the time duration of this usage should 
not be underestimated, the cross having been substituted and restored several time over the years, 
without stirring any discussion), has been included by the Congress among the national memorials, the 
monuments honoring the sacrifices that built the American heritage. Consequently the government 
found itself bound, on the one hand, to comply with the injunction; on the other hand, to avoid 
offending those who shared the message of the cross. 
Following a line of reasoning which again reminds me of the administrative judgment in Lautsi, the 
plurality clarifies that it would be wrong to disassociate the context where the cross stands, 
emphasizing only its religious significance. The Constitution, Kennedy states, does not require the 
government to avoid every public recognition of the role of religion in the society. 
The liberal minority has a very different view. The opinion has been written by Justice Stevens, 
joined by Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor: the cross bears a sectarian message. The land transfer 
does not end the endorsement by the government: a) a «reasonable observer» still thinks that the 
government endorses the cross, and this is particularly true since the cross has been defined a national 
memorial, so that the endorsement continues irrespective of the public or private ownership of the plot 
of land; b) the land transfer perpetuates the endorsement, because it has been enacted only to ensure 
the visibility of the cross. 
With the judgment Town of Greece v. Galloway, of 5
th
 of May 2014, the Supreme Court had been 
called upon to decide whether the town of Greece had violated the Establishment Clause by deciding 
to open the monthly meetings of the town board with the Pledge of Allegiance, followed by a prayer 
recited by religious ministers chosen, first, casually from the telephone directory, later from a list 
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 See on that topic P. Annichino, F. Gedicks, Cross, crucifix, culture: an approach to the constitutional meaning of 
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compiled by the town administration over the years. As all the congregations in the town were 
Christian, from 1999 until 2007 only 4 out of 120 meetings of the town board had been opened by 
non-Christian ministers. Only from the dissenting opinion by Justice Kagan emerges that the 
celebrants recited the prayer with their back towards the town board (in the ceremonial portion of the 
meeting, when the board was not engaged in decision-making) and addressing directly the public, 
made up by all the citizens interested in taking part to the meeting. The text of the prayer was chosen 
freely, without any previous control: in different meetings references had been made to God, Jesus 
Christ, the resurrection, the ascension of Jesus Christ the savior etc. 
The plaintiffs did not ask to stop the prayer altogether, but only to make it more ecumenical and 
inclusive, by making references to a generic god and not associating the town administration with any 
particular faith. 
The Supreme Court finds no violation of the Establishment Clause with a 5-4 vote, whose opinion 
is delivered, as often happened in this matter, by Justice Kennedy. The Court conservatives specify 
that the so-called legislative prayer, albeit intrinsically religious, historically has been considered 
compatible with the Establishment Clause: the precedent here is Marsh v. Chambers, where, very 
briefly, it was held that the opening prayer (officiated by a religious minister paid with State funds) of 
the Nebraska legislature respected the First Amendment and, particularly, the Establishment Clause. A 
reasonable observer, familiar with the American tradition, would never feel pressured by the 
traditional legislative prayer, addressed in the first place to the legislator. In this decision, the reference 
to history and tradition is very clear. It is interesting to find again the statement that «any test the Court 
adopts must acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the critical 
scrutiny of time and political change». The opinion of the conservative wing is that the Court must 
find whether the prayer practice complies with the tradition followed since the First Congress. The 
historical argument is reinforced by a point made by Scalia and Alito
29
 in their concurring opinion: the 
practices of the First Congress are surely respectful of the First Amendment, whose original meaning 
is mirrored in the Marsh precedent. The historic practice may not be called into question. In the way 
the majority reads Marsh, the legislative prayer does not violate the First Amendment not because it is 
generic, but «because our history and tradition have shown that prayer in this limited context could 
coexist with the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom». 
This decision undoubtedly exemplifies the conservatives’ predilection for performing the coercion 
test: at least for some Justices, a theological discourse is not necessarily coercive. 
On the contrary, the minority opinion, by Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and 
Ginsburg, finds that the prayer violates the norm of religious equality, although prudently remarking, 
at the outset, that the pluralism and inclusion which should characterize a local administration do not 
transform it in a religion-free zone. 
From a European perspective again, it is interesting to observe that no Justice goes so far as to 
advocate the practical elimination of the prayer: in Marsh, this radical position was supported by a 
very narrow minority, which held that eliminating the prayer would reinvigorate both «the spirit of 
religion», and «the spirit of freedom»
30
. 
In legal scholarship, the strongest critics of the Robert Court have pointed out that the idea of the 
Establishment Clause as a guarantee of a public space which is equidistant towards different faiths, as 
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well as towards those who do not profess any faith, is under attack
31
. This may be true or false, but 
surely the accommodation of religion, which used to be a largely
32
 appreciated American peculiarity, 
seems fallen in disgrace, also due to the ascent of a particularly poignant version of legal 
egalitarianism which considers it discriminatory towards the different minorities comprised in 
American society
33
. 
4. Conclusions 
I will now try to summarize some considerations which certainly, due the very limited number of US 
Supreme Court taken into account, have no ambition to establish any definitive comparison between 
the two courts.  
Bearing in mind that the notion of secularism (laicità or laïcité) is deeply entrenched with the 
peculiar constitutional history of each countries
34
, I make the following points. 
First of all, although it has been argued that a shared ‘transnational non-establishment principle is 
emerging’35, or more prudently that a shared form of secular order is developing and that the 
differences between the two case law are ultimately more a matter of tone than substance
36
, in my 
opinion the ECtHR goes well beyond the US Supreme Court: this is to say, the European Court is 
clearly engaged in building a European secularism that leaves religious symbols outside the public 
space. 
Yet, its “non-constitutional” nature, on the one hand, and, on the other, the margin of appreciation 
doctrine force the ECtHR to recognize the peculiarities of national legal systems, in whose texture the 
influences of majoritarian religious confessions are deeply embedded. Therefore I largely agree with 
who considered that ECtHR decisions merely reflect the uncertainties of an international court that 
navigates without clear points of reference through the increasing complexities of the relations 
between religion, law, society and culture
37
. The Strasbourg Court adopts a conception of secularism 
which, in principle, is very similar to the French and, consequently, very different from American 
secularism. Indeed, it has been recalled that the value protected by the Convention is religious freedom 
and not secularity, however legitimate and traditional the latter may be in European States
38
. 
Secondly, although in different ways, both Courts employ arguments based on tradition and 
history, to the detriment of individual and minority interests. So the European and the US Courts, in 
deciding on the concrete issues at stake in single cases, hold what might seem a common position: 
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protecting the majority confession (or, at any rate, the confession favored by the government, in the 
US). The result is similar, but the grounds for the position are very different, as very different is, 
again, the nature of the two systems. 
Thirdly, there is a certain deference towards the choices made by national authorities, with the 
exception of Lautsi (1): this is not surprising, for what concerns the ECtHR, which is an international 
non a constitutional court, as highlighted at the outset; on the contrary, for the critics of the Roberts 
Court, this attitude deserves to be stigmatized in a constitutional jurisdiction. 
In the fourth place, the facts leading to every judgment are analyzed in detail: this is typical of 
common law jurisdictions, and confirms an interesting feature of the ECtHR. 
Last, the US rulings show that the construction of the Establishment Clause, which presently 
prevails, lacks a solid consensus inside the Supreme Court
39
. The same is true for the European Court. 
The reasons for this lack are partly similar, but once again, peculiarities can be clearly seen: the 
division between conservatives and liberal within the US Supreme Court is a feature that has not 
parallel in Europe: e.g., a broad distinction between conservative and liberal judges could arguably be 
made also with regard to the members of the European Court; and yet this distinction would not 
perfectly mirror the ideological cleavages inside the Supreme Court, whose liberal members have not 
gone so far as to advocate the practical elimination of the traditional prayer (lastly, Town of Greece v. 
Galloway). Today, the rift between the two groups inside the Roberts Court is manifest. On the one 
hand, there is an attempt to reduce the meaning of the Establishment Clause, which employs a very 
strict notion of coercion or appeals to the religious and historical heritage, as seen above. On the other 
hand, not even the liberal wing is prepared to hold that the rationale of the Establishment Clause is 
pursuing the neutrality of the public space, as in France. 
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